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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVACY-RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL ON PUB-
LIC CONVEYANCES.-P, public utilities commission, on the protest
of D, passenger, investigated the use of transit radio receivers on
streetcars in Washington, D. C., and determined that such was
consistent with public convenience, comfort, and safety. The pro-
grams contained music, news, and short commercials. The ques-
tion is whether such is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amend-
ment as an invasion of the constitutional right of privacy of the
passengers. Held, on certiorari, reversing the lower court, that the
right of privacy "is substantially limited by the rights of others
when its possessor travels on a public thorofare or rides in a public
conveyance." Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 72 Sup. Ct. 813
(1952).
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the passen-
gers are on the streetcar from necessity and are a "captive audience",
their attention thereby being compelled, and that such required
listening would lead to the control of men's minds. The problem
involves a new phase in the law of privacy, with no precedent, and
we must seek the answer from related fields.
Clearly, at common law noise alone may constitute an abatable
nuisance. Baltimore &c Potomac R.R. v. Fifth Baptist Church,
108 U.S. 317 (1883); Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201
(6th Cir. 1932); Chicago v. Reuter Bros. Iron Works, 398 Ill. 202,
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75 N.E.2d 355 (1947); Ritz v. Woman's Club, 114 W. Va. 675, 173
S.E. 564 (1934). Music, a form of noise, may also become a
nuisance enjoinable in equity. Edmunds v. Duff, 280 Pa. 385, 124
At. 489 (1924); State v. Turner, 198 S.C. 487, 18 S.E.2d 372 (1942);
Snyder v. Cabell, 29 W. Va. 48, 1 S.E. 241 (1887). To be an action-
able nuisance, however, such noise (music) must be so excessive
and unreasonable as to produce actual physical discomfort and an-
noyance to persons of ordinary sensibilities; thus, injury to one of
high sensitivity would not render the noise abatable, unless the
noise were so substantial and unreasonable as to affect the health
of an ordinary man. Kentucky & W. Va. Power Co. v. Anderson,
288 Ky. 501, 156 S.W.2d 857 (1941); Meadowbrook Swimming Club
v. Albert, 173 Md. 641, 197 At. 146 (1938); Tortorella v. H. Traiser
& Co., 284 Mass. 497, 188 N.E. 254 (1933). Admitting, therefore,
the right of the property owner to abate noise as a nuisance if it
meets the above requirements, is this common law right of such a
character as to be protected as a constitutional right of the indi-
vidual under due process of law? D thought there was a depriva-
tion of his liberty because of an unpermitted invasion of his
freedom to converse and to meditate.
An ordinance forbidding the use of sound trucks emitting
"loud and raucous noises" on public streets has been held constitu-
tional the court there recognizing the right of citizens to some
degree of quiet and order needed to carry on their activities, etc.
Kovaks v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). In Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1948), where a similar statute was held unconstitutional
on its face because of the discretion given to the chief of police in
granting permission to use sound devices, such being a previous
restraint of the right of free speech, Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his
dissent stated: "If uncontrolled [sound amplification], the result
is intrusion into cherished privacy ... surely there is not a consti-
tutional right to force unwilling people to listen." However, in
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), a municipal ordinance
forbidding persons to summon residents to the door to pass hand-
bills was held unconstitutional as a denial of freedom of speech and
press, appellant being a "Jehovah's Witness" distributing adver-
tisements of a religious meeting. The individual's rights are not
absolute even in his own home.
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Thus, the right of privacy at best is very limited, and the court
jealously guards against its invocation to the prejudice of the
rights of others as indicated by Martin v. Struthers, supra. Applying
the doctrine of abatement of noise as a nuisance, we may construc-
tively state that only where the infringement is excessive and un-
easonable to a man of ordinary sensibilities will the court consider
bringing into play right of privacy. Here, the programs were not
unreasonable, and the great majority of passengers found them
inoffensive and favored their continuance; D does not represent
the ordinary man. The holding of the court appears just, consider-
ing the rights of all persons involved. In answering Mr. Justice
Douglas's objection, if ever control of the mind were threatened,
then such would be clearly unreasonable and a valid basis for
objection.
G. D. H. S.
CRIMINAL LAW-EFFECT OF PARDON ON HABITUAL CRIMINAL
STATuT.-Habeas corpus proceeding by P to obtain release from
imprisonment for life for third offense under the habitual criminal
statute [W. VA. CODE c. 61, art. 11, §§ 18 and 19 (Michie, 1949) ].
P claimed that the statute did not apply since, after commission and
conviction of first two offenses punishable by confinement in the
penitentiary, he was given a pardon by the governor. The circuit
court overruled D's demurrer to the petition and, on joint motion
of the parties, certified the question to the supreme court. Held,
that a pardon by the governor of convictions for offenses punish-
able by confinement in the penitentiary does not exempt the
prisoner from increased punishment under the habitual criminal
statute. Reversed and remanded. Dean v. Skeen, 70 S.E.2d 256
(W. Va. 1952).
This is the first case in West Virginia determining the effect
of a full pardon on the application of the habitual criminal statute.
In State v. Fisher, 123 W. Va. 745, 18 S.E.2d 649 (1941), the
court, in dealing with a conditional pardon, held that it had no
effect upon prior convictions and that the habitual criminal statute
applied. The court also expressed the opinion that an unconditional
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